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Exceptional Circumstances: Immigration, Imports, 
the Coronavirus, and Climate Change as 
Emergencies 
DANIEL A. FARBER† 
President Trump has used emergency powers to achieve key parts of his policy agenda, 
exemplified by his travel ban, funding for the border wall, and tariffs on many imports. He 
has also declared the 2020 coronavirus pandemic a national emergency, but has taken 
relatively little action under this declaration to date. This Essay examines how the 
Administration has invoked emergency powers in these and other settings, along with the 
responses of the courts. This Essay also considers how these actions could be used as 
precedents by future Presidents, such as declaring a climate change emergency. Finally, this 
Essay discusses the risks of normalizing the use of emergency powers, along with the forces 
that may impel Presidents in that direction. Although overuse of emergency powers is the 
problem that has received most attention, Trump’s response to the coronavirus illustrates the 
possibility for abusing discretion in the opposite direction. The discretion inherent in 
emergency powers may sometimes prevent needed government actions when taking them 
would be politically unpalatable to the President. Thus, whether a power is exercised or not, 
reposing unlimited discretion in the President comes with serious risks as well as possible 
benefits.  
 
 †  Sho Sato Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Center on Law, Energy, and the Environment, 
University of California, Berkeley. Sean Kiernan provided invaluable research assistance. The coronavirus 
outbreak in the United States erupted while this Essay was in press. Some additional material has been added to 
address the use of emergency powers in this context. 
1144 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:1143 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1145 
I.      CASE STUDIES ........................................................................................ 1147 
A.  GRID RELIABILITY ..................................................................... 1147 
B.  THE BORDER WALL ................................................................... 1149 
C.  TARIFFS ...................................................................................... 1154 
D.  THE TRAVEL BAN ...................................................................... 1158 
E.  PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS AND DEREGULATION ................. 1162 
F.  THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC .................................................. 1164 
II.     LOOKING AHEAD: A CLIMATE EMERGENCY? ....................................... 1169 
III.   UNILATERAL PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION IN PERSPECTIVE .......... 1172 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 1175 
  
July 2020] EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES 1145 
INTRODUCTION 
Some of President Trump’s most dramatic policy decisions have been 
justified on the basis of emergencies or national security—exceptional 
circumstances that circumvent normal restrictions on executive power. The 
Trump Administration has also sought to take advantage of exceptions from 
normal legal requirements in more mundane circumstances, such as suspending 
Obama-era regulations without providing notice or an opportunity to comment.1 
Bold executive action, though in opposing directions, was a feature of preceding 
administrations.2 But Trump has greatly intensified the use of emergency powers 
and has openly used these measures to defy Congress and evade judicial review. 
Moreover, although it is hard to be sure of Trump’s subjective beliefs, many 
observers might view some of the claims of emergency or national security 
threats to be pretextual. 
The Trump Administration has faced some pushback on its use of these 
powers.3 Lower court decisions have at least delayed some of the actions and led 
to their narrowing. Yet courts have consistently refused to look past the claim of 
exceptional circumstances when made by the President. Claims of exceptional 
circumstances to justify actions by agencies, as opposed to the President, have 
been less successful. 
Although we cannot be sure of this, Trump’s relative success in advancing 
his domestic policy agenda through use of emergency powers could well set a 
precedent for future Presidents, whether or not they are ideological soulmates. 
There is certainly room for future exploitation of national security and 
emergency powers, given that there are almost three thousand statutes 
referencing one or the other.4 Congress has very rarely attempted to define 
national security, and then only in the broadest terms.5 Given emergency powers, 
 
 1. Memorandum from Reince Priebus, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, to the Heads of Exec. 
Dep’ts and Agencies, Regulatory Freeze Pending Review (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
presidential-actions/memorandum-heads-executive-departments-agencies/. 
 2. See Jerry L. Mashaw & David Berke, Presidential Administration in a Regime of Separated Powers: 
An Analysis of Recent American Experience, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 549, 551 (2018). Mashaw and Berke 
concluded: 
  In general, this study finds in both administrations bold attempts to accrete executive power; 
presidential administration insinuating itself more and more into areas where proponents of 
presidentialism have cautioned against aggressive use of presidential directive authority; and the rise 
of organizational techniques, like policy czars and “shadow cabinets,” that institutionalize 
presidential control in the absence of specific presidential directions. 
Id. 
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. Amy L. Stein reports over 2100 statutes referring to national security and over 800 referring to national 
emergencies. Nearly 400 refer to presidential national security powers. Amy L. Stein, A Statutory National 
Security President, 70 FLA. L. REV. 1183, 1193 (2018). Of these, a “significant number” of presidential 
delegations lack “any discernible limits.” Id. at 1195. 
 5. Stein located only three examples of statutes defining the term. The definitions were “national defense 
and foreign relations of the United States” and “the national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of 
the United States.” Id. at 1197. For further discussion of the definitional problem, see id. at 1197–1203. 
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as Justice Robert Jackson once intimated, presidents have every incentive to 
identify situations as emergencies where they can use those powers.6 
Part I of this Essay will examine the Trump Administration’s efforts to use 
extraordinary powers in contexts ranging from an international travel ban to 
saving coal-fired power plants. What is notable is not just the invocation of these 
extraordinary powers, but the extent to which they have been used to implement 
high-profile, controversial politics. In addition, Trump has made little effort to 
conceal the extent to which the official justifications for these actions deviate 
from their actual purposes. In contrast, in the face of what seems to be a genuine 
emergency, Trump has been timid about using emergency powers to address the 
2020 coronavirus outbreak. 
To provide a basis for a more balanced assessment of this type of 
presidential action, Part II sketches out how a progressive President might use 
the same strategies to address climate change. The purpose of that exercise is to 
provide a more balanced appraisal of the systemic implications of Trump’s 
actions, by separating the process issues from the substance of his decisions. 
Part III then assesses the pros and cons of using emergency powers to 
achieve domestic policy goals. From the perspective of a President using this 
strategy, the advantages are fairly obvious. It allows for rapid action with 
minimum procedural requirements and reduced judicial oversight. It also 
dramatizes the President’s action, not only gratifying the President’s supporters 
but perhaps helping to persuade others of the need for action. One downside is 
the possibility of backlash from Congress or the public. Another downside is 
that emergency measures can be repealed just as easily by the next President, 
leading to serious policy instability. 
The most significant issues about aggressive use of emergency powers, 
however, involve the implications for democratic governance. Given 
congressional gridlock, a cumbersome regulatory process, and courts that are 
often unfriendly to major regulatory innovations, use of extraordinary powers 
may offer the only available option for responding to urgent policy needs. 
Moreover, direct action by the President, as opposed to administrative agencies, 
increases political accountability—if you don’t like the border wall or the travel 
ban, you know who to blame. But the negative implications for governance are 
also serious. The President’s use of extraordinary powers is, at most, loosely 
guided by statutory criteria and subject to attenuated judicial review. This poses 
a threat to the rule of law, shortcuts public deliberation and expert analysis, and 
undermines the separation of powers. On the whole, use of extraordinary powers 
to make policy seems best avoided except in cases of necessity, but that precept 
may do increasingly little work if other policymaking mechanisms are blocked. 
The coronavirus outbreak illuminates another potential problem with 
vesting highly discretionary emergency powers in the President. A President’s 
 
 6. Jackson said the Framers “knew what emergencies were, knew the pressures they engender for 
authoritative action, knew, too, how they afford a ready pretext for usurpation[,]” adding that “[w]e may also 
suspect that they suspected that emergency powers would tend to kindle emergencies.” Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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failure to make full use of these powers, when circumstances call for more 
aggressive action, may also reflect similar problems: a closed decision-making 
process in which expert analysis is undervalued, and in which Congress is 
sidelined. Presidential leadership is undoubtedly crucial in responding to 
emergencies, but relying so heavily on any single individual’s unguided 
discretion carries both the risk of overreliance on emergency powers and the risk 
of under-reliance on them when they are really needed. 
I. CASE STUDIES 
President Trump and his Administration have relied heavily, though by no 
means exclusively, on claims of exceptional circumstances to fulfill key 
campaign promises quickly and with minimal procedural hurdles. This strategy 
has been used under diverse circumstances, sometimes successfully and 
sometimes less so. Most notably, courts generally have been extremely reluctant, 
even in the face of constitutional claims, to probe claims that an emergency or 
national security crisis exists. Below, we consider five case studies in which the 
Administration has invoked extraordinary circumstances as a basis for statutory 
powers. 
A.  GRID RELIABILITY 
During his campaign, Trump emphasized his support for the coal industry. 
Yet, coal-fired power plants have continued to close during his presidency.7 As 
one of several responses, the Administration considered the use of emergency 
powers. Under section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act, the Secretary of Energy 
can take emergency action to maintain the operation of the electric grid. The 
Defense Production Act, a statute dating from the Korean War era, allows the 
President to use a variety of economic tools as needed for national defense, 
which Trump argued applied to his efforts to prop up the coal industry. There 
were legal issues, however, with the application of these statutes.8 
 
 7. See Scott DiSavino, U.S. Coal-Fired Power Plants Closing Fast Despite Trump’s Pledge of Support 
for Industry, REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2020, 4:10 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-coal-decline-graphic/ 
us-coal-fired-power-plants-closing-fast-despite-trumps-pledge-of-support-for-industry-idUSKBN1ZC15A; 
Michael Grunwald, Trump’s Love Affair with Coal, POLITICO MAG. (Oct. 15, 2017), https://www.politico. 
com/magazine/story/2017/10/15/trumps-love-affair-with-coal-215710. 
 8. As I explained at the time: 
The plan was to use one or more of a trio of emergency provisions. The first is a section of the 
Federal Power Act that authorizes the Department of Energy to order generators to run during wars 
or other emergencies, including grid emergencies. Both DOE precedent and a D.C. Circuit case 
say this doesn’t apply to fuel supply issues. The second statute, which traces back to the Korean 
War allows the President to prioritize performance of defense contracts over civilian contracts and 
allocate materials, services and facilities to promote the national defense. But it doesn’t seem to 
provide authority to force companies to buy these items. It also contains loan and subsidy 
provisions, but they seem to be limited to $50 million in any one year. The final statute, another 
section of the Federal Power Act, authorizes DOE to issue emergency measures in response to a 
grid security emergency. These measures last only fifteen days at a time. 
Dan Farber, “National Security” Coal-Bailout Collapses, LEGAL PLANET (Oct. 16, 2018), https://legal-planet. 
org/2018/10/16/national-security-coal-bailout-collapses/. For more extensive discussion of the statutory issues, 
1148 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:1143 
Nevertheless, coal advocates, including then-Secretary of Energy Rick 
Perry, argued that the government should use these powers to keep coal-fired 
plants running. The theory behind this argument is that other sources of power 
might fail due to a lack of energy supply—renewables because of weather, or 
natural gas because of failures or sabotage of gas pipelines. Coal plants, on the 
other hand, keep an inventory of coal on-site. 
In June of 2018, the White House directed Secretary Perry to take 
“immediate steps” to halt the loss of coal-fired plants.9 A draft memo suggested 
the parameters of the plan: 
The Energy Department would exercise its emergency authority to order grid 
operators to give preference to plants “that have a secure on-site fuel supply” and 
that “are essential to support the Nation’s defense facilities, critical energy 
infrastructure, and other critical infrastructure.” Only coal and nuclear plants 
regularly keep fuel on site.10 
The plan ran into strong headwinds. As one member of the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) put it, “FERC does not pick winners and losers 
in the market. Instead we create an environment where the market can pick the 
winners and losers.”11 By October 2018, Politico reported that the “White House 
has shelved the plan amid opposition from the president’s own advisers on the 
National Security Council and National Economic Council.”12 Some of the 
resistance may have been based on concerns over weakly grounded national 
security rationales or interference with competitive electricity markets. But more 
specific concerns were that Perry had not succeeded in identifying individual 
coal plants in danger of closing whose operations were critical to grid reliability, 
and the plan would have caused cost increases that no one wanted to absorb.13 
 
see SHARON B. JACOBS, GETCHES-WILKINSON CTR. NAT. RES., ENERGY, & ENV’T, & ARI PESKOE, HARVARD 
LAW SCH. ENVTL. & ENERGY L. PROGRAM, ENERGY EMERGENCIES VS. MANUFACTURED CRISES: THE LIMITS OF 
FEDERAL AUTHORITY TO DISRUPT POWER MARKETS (June 3, 2019), https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/ 
uploads/Energy-Emergencies-vs-Manufactured-Crises-FINAL.pdf. 
 9. Statement from the Press Secretary on Fuel-Secure Power Facilities (June 1, 2018), https://www.white 
house.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-fuel-secure-power-facilities/. The statement explains: 
   President Donald J. Trump believes in total energy independence and dominance, and that 
keeping America’s energy grid and infrastructure strong and secure protects our national security, 
public safety, and economy from intentional attacks and natural disasters. 
  Unfortunately, impending retirements of fuel-secure power facilities are leading to a rapid 
depletion of a critical part of our Nation’s energy mix, and impacting the resilience of our power 
grid. 
Id. 
 10. Steven Mufson, Trump Orders Energy Secretary Perry to Halt Shutdown of Coal and Nuclear Plants, 
WASH. POST (June 1, 2018, 10:58 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trump-officials-
preparing-to-use-cold-war-emergency-powers-to-protect-coal-and-nuclear-plants/2018/06/01/230f0778-65a9-
11e8-a69c-b944de66d9e7_story.html. 
 11. John H. Cushman, Jr., There’s No Power Grid Emergency Requiring a Coal Bailout, Regulators Say, 
INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (June 12, 2018), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/12062018/ferc-no-power-grid-
national-security-emergency-trump-perry-coal-subsidy-energy-regulators-congress. 
 12. Eric Wolff & Darius Dixon, Rick Perry’s Coal Rescue Runs Aground at White House, POLITICO (Oct. 
15, 2018, 7:52 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/10/15/rick-perry-coal-rescue-trump-850528. 
 13. Id. 
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B.  THE BORDER WALL 
Another important Trump campaign pledge involved immigration. “We 
will build a great wall along the southern border—and Mexico will pay for the 
wall . . . 100 percent. They don’t know it yet, but they’re gonna pay for the 
wall.”14 The funding problem proved more difficult than expected, however. 
After several bitter disputes with Congress over funding for the wall, Trump 
issued a declaration that a national emergency existed at the southern border.15 
His Acting Chief of Staff, John Michael (“Mick”) Mulvaney, had telegraphed 
that this move would be forthcoming unless Congress provided the funding: 
  The president is going to build the wall . . . You saw what the Vice President 
said there, and that’s our attitude at this point, is we will take as much money as 
you can give us and then we will go find money someplace else legally in order to 
secure that southern barrier. But this is going to get built with or without 
Congress.16 
Mulvaney added that an emergency declaration was “absolutely on the table.”17 
The statutory basis for the emergency declaration was the National 
Emergencies Act.18 The Proclamation conceded that “[t]he problem of large-
scale unlawful migration through the southern border is long-standing,” but 
contended that “the situation has worsened in certain respects in recent years.”19 
Specifically, “recent years have seen sharp increases in the number of family 
units entering and seeking entry to the United States and an inability to provide 
detention space for many of these aliens while their removal proceedings are 
pending.”20 Consequently, many of these “family units” allegedly disappear into 
the general population and are not available for later deportation.21 In response 
to this situation, the Proclamation calls for additional support by the Armed 
Forces at the border. In particular, the Proclamation invokes two statutory 
provisions that authorize the diversion of service members and defense funding 
from other construction projects.22 
 
 14. Nolan D. McCaskill, Trump Promises Wall and Massive Deportation Program, POLITICO, 
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/donald-trump-immigration-address-arizona-227612 (last updated Aug. 
31, 2016). 
 15. Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4,949, 4,949 (Feb. 20, 2019). 
 16. Gregg Re, Border Wall Talks Break Down Ahead of Second Possible Government Shutdown, FOX 
NEWS (Feb. 10, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/talks-on-border-wall-break-down-ahead-of-second-
possible-government-shutdown. 
 17. Id. 
 18. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651 (2018). The provision enabling emergency declarations is 50 U.S.C. § 1621. 
It does not specify any criteria for determination whether an emergency exists. 
 19. Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. at 4,949. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. Trump invoked 10 U.S.C. sections 12302 and 2808. Under section 12302(a), the Secretaries of the 
military departments can pull any service member from any unit into the “Ready Reserve” for active duty. 
Section 2808(a) provides: 
   In the event of a declaration of war or the declaration by the President of a national emergency 
in accordance with the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) that requires use of the 
armed forces, the Secretary of Defense, without regard to any other provision of law, may undertake 
military construction projects, and may authorize the Secretaries of the military departments to 
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Even on its face, the Proclamation does not make much of a case that an 
“emergency” exists in the ordinary sense of the word. The basic situation is said 
to have existed for considerable time, and even the changed circumstances have 
apparently occurred during recent years. If an emergency is supposed to be 
sudden and unexpected, the Proclamation’s description of border conditions 
fails to meet the bill. Moreover, the movement of troops to the border seems to 
serve simply as creating a predicate for transferring construction funds to the 
wall, as much as it allows for use of military skills or equipment. Given that 
Congress had recently turned down the Administration’s funding request for 
wall construction, there was understandable suspicion about the bona fides of 
the Proclamation. Both Houses of Congress passed resolutions disapproving the 
emergency declaration, but were unable to override a presidential veto.23 In 
vetoing the resolution, Trump continued to insist that conditions on the border 
constituted an emergency.24 
According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the number of 
declared national emergencies has risen steadily in the past twenty years to 
around thirty declarations as of 2019.25 On average, the emergency declarations 
studied by CRS remained in effect for about a decade, and one has remained in 
effect for forty years.26 Some of the emergency declarations relate to chronic 
issues such as cybersecurity, rather than specific crises.27 Thus, while it may not 
correspond to the ordinary understanding of the word, Trump’s designation of 
chronic immigration as an emergency was not entirely unprecedented. 
Yet the Proclamation gave rise to several lawsuits. California v. Trump 
challenged funds appropriation for the border wall.28 The primary allegation was 
that the President’s reallocation of funds under section 2808 violated the 
Appropriations Clause because it failed to meet the criteria of a valid re-
 
undertake military construction projects, not otherwise authorized by law that are necessary to 
support such use of the armed forces. Such projects may be undertaken only within the total amount 
of funds that have been appropriated for military construction, including funds appropriated for 
family housing, that have not been obligated. 
10 U.S.C. 2808(a) (2018). 
 23. Emily Cochrane, House Fails to Override Trump’s Veto, Preserving National Emergency Order, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/26/us/politics/national-emergency-vote.html. 
 24. Memorandum from President Donald J. Trump to the U.S. Senate, S.J. Res. 54 Veto Message (Oct. 15, 
2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/s-j-res-54-veto-message/. The memorandum stated: 
  The southern border, however, continues to be a major entry point for criminals, gang 
members, and illicit narcotics to come into our country. As explained in Proclamation 9844, in my 
veto message regarding H.J. Res. 46, and in congressional testimony from multiple Administration 
officials, the ongoing crisis at the southern border threatens core national security interests. In 
addition, security challenges at the southern border exacerbate an ongoing humanitarian crisis that 
threatens the well-being of vulnerable populations, including women and children. 
Id. 
 25. CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45618, THE INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY 
ECONOMIC POWERS ACT: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND USE 20 fig.4 (2019). 
 26. Id. at 18. 
 27. Id. at 20. 
 28. California v. Trump, 407 F. Supp. 3d 869, 877 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
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appropriation under that section.29 In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
selection of projects to defund was arbitrary and capricious and that an 
environmental impact statement was required.30 The court held that the 
declaration of a national emergency requiring use of armed forces was 
nonjusticiable.31 In contrast, the court concluded that the transfer of funds did 
present a justiciable issue under the Appropriations Clause.32 Moreover, the 
plaintiffs had standing due to injuries to their environmental, professional, 
aesthetic, and recreational interests.33 
On the merits, the District Court concluded that the border wall did not 
qualify as a military construction project under the funds-transfer statute.34 
Section 2808 was not being carried out with respect to “military installation[s],” 
defined as “a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, or other activity.”35 The 
term “other activity” had to be construed in the context of the more specific 
items, and the wall was not similar in nature or scope to base, camp, post, station, 
yard, or center.36 Nor was it “necessary to support use of armed forces.”37 In 
reality, the appropriation was merely intended to provide more efficient and 
effective support to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a civilian 
agency.38 Finally, the court rejected the claim that the choice of projects was 
arbitrary and capricious, since they were selected “to provide [the Department 
of Defense (DoD)] time to work with Congress to determine opportunities to 
restore funds” for military construction projects that were defunded in order to 
divert funds to pay for border barrier construction.39 The court agreed, however, 
that an environmental impact statement would be required.40 The court issued a 
permanent injunction against the use of military funds for the border wall.41 
In a second case, Sierra Club v. Trump, the District Court held that 
reprogramming the construction funds violated the Defense Appropriations Act 
of 2019.42 Section 8005 provides that such funding transfers cannot be made 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 878, 900. 
 31. Id. at 890. 
 32. Id. at 888. 
 33. Id. at 885–86. 
 34. Id. at 889. 
 35. Id.; see also 10 U.S.C. § 2801(a), (c)(4) (2018) (defining the terms “military construction” and 
“military installation,” respectively). 
 36. California v. Trump, 407 F. Supp. 3d at 892. 
 37. Id. at 869. 
 38. Id. at 897. 
 39. Id. at 899. 
 40. Id. at 901. The U.S. Government’s unlawful invocation of military construction funds statute barred 
their exemption from NEPA. Section 2808 permits the Secretary of Defense to undertake military construction 
projects without regard to NEPA’s EIS requirement. But the President unlawfully invoked the statute to divert 
funds for military construction projects in order to build wall on southern border. Thus, the statutory provision, 
“without regard to any other provision of law,” was not triggered. Id. 
 41. Id. at 902. 
 42. Sierra Club v. Trump, 379 F. Supp. 3d 883, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2019); see also Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-245, § 9002, 132 Stat. 2981, 3042 (2018) (providing that the 
Secretary of Defense may transfer money to the DoD, subject to certain restrictions). 
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“unless for higher priority items, based on unforeseen military requirements, 
than those for which originally appropriated and in no case where the item for 
which funds are requested has been denied by the Congress.”43 
The Ninth Circuit declined to stay the injunction pending appeal.44 In the 
court’s view, the government had failed to make a strong showing that it was 
likely to succeed on the merits. Congress had denied funding for the same wall 
construction projects.45 As the court observed: 
  President Trump has made numerous requests to Congress for funding for 
construction of a barrier on the U.S.-Mexico border. 
 . . . . 
  The situation reached an impasse in December 2018. During negotiations with 
Congress over an appropriations bill to fund various parts of the federal 
government for the remainder of the fiscal year, the President announced his 
unequivocal position that “any measure that funds the government must include 
border security.” . . . On December 20, 2018, the House of Representatives passed 
a continuing resolution that allocated $5.7 billion in border barrier funding. But 
the Senate rejected the bill. The President could not reach an agreement with 
lawmakers on whether the spending bill would include border barrier funding, 
triggering what would become the nation’s longest partial government shutdown.46 
The dispute between the House and the President led to a lengthy government 
shutdown.47 During the negotiations, “the President made clear that he still 
intended to build a border barrier, with or without funding from Congress,” 
indicating that he would use emergency powers to do so if necessary.48 
Ultimately, Congress appropriated less than a quarter of the amount the 
President requested. At the same time that he signed the bill, he issued the 
emergency declaration to enable fund transfers for building the wall.49 
The court found that the organizations bringing the suit possessed Article 
III standing to invoke separation of powers principles to seek to enjoin the 
proposed “reprogramming” of funds.50 In addition, the court found that the 
reprogramming was reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, and 
that the organizations fell within the zone of interests protected by the 
Appropriations Clause.51 Finally, the balance of interests favored the injunction 
given the government’s constitutional violation.52 
The government turned to the Supreme Court for a stay of the district 
court’s order. The Court granted the stay, saying that “[a]mong the reasons is 
that the Government has made a sufficient showing at this stage that the 
 
 43. Department of Defense Appropriations Act § 8005, 132 Stat. at 2999. 
 44. Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 677 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 45. Id. at 689. 
 46. Id. at 677–78 (citations omitted). 
 47. Id. at 678. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 679. 
 50. Id. at 696–97. 
 51. Id. at 700–04. 
 52. Id. at 704–07. 
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plaintiffs have no cause of action to obtain review of the Acting Secretary’s 
compliance with Section 8005.”53 
Two other efforts were made to challenge the funding transfer. In El Paso 
County v. Trump, the challenge was brought by entities (the county and an 
organization) who would have benefited from the defunded projects due to the 
executive order.54 Like the California district court, the Texas district judge held 
that the transfer violated the appropriations bill in which Congress had provided 
only limited funding for the wall.55 The Texas judge’s theory was a bit different, 
however. He argued that the specific appropriation of limited funds for the wall 
overrode the more general provisions allowing fund transfers.56 He also relied 
on section 739 of the Appropriations Act, which prohibits transfers of funds to 
increase the funding for any appropriation unless authorized by an 
appropriations act, whereas the provision the President relied on was not enacted 
as part of an appropriations act.57 On December 19, 2019, the judge issued a 
declaratory judgment and permanent injunction against the transfer.58 The court 
of appeals issued a stay based, among other reasons, on “the substantial 
likelihood that appellees lack Article III standing.”59 In U.S. House of 
Representatives v. Mnuchin, the district court held that the House lacked 
standing to defend its constitutional appropriations prerogatives.60 At the time 
of this writing, the appeal in the case is scheduled to be heard en banc in the D.C. 
Circuit.61 
Quite apart from their merits, these cases involved some procedural 
perplexities. Who, if anyone, had standing to challenge the shift in funding? 
Could the suit be brought under the Administrative Procedure Act, or do federal 
courts otherwise have authority to hear actions to enjoin unconstitutional 
actions? The Supreme Court’s stay order suggests that it believes that the answer 
to that question is no. On the merits, the cases presented not only significant 
statutory interpretation issues, but the more perplexing issue of when a 
misinterpretation of an appropriations law translates into a violation of the 
Appropriations Clause. 
 
 53. Trump v. Sierra Club, 140 S. Ct. 1 (2019). 
 54. El Paso Cty. v. Trump, 408 F. Supp. 3d 840, 845 (W.D. Tex. 2019). 
 55. Id. at 857–58. 
 56. Id. at 859–60. 
 57. Id. at 859. Section 739 provides that: 
  None of the funds made available in this or any other appropriations Act may be used to increase, 
eliminate, or reduce funding for a program, project, or activity as proposed in the President’s budget 
request for a fiscal year until such proposed change is subsequently enacted in an appropriation Act, 
or unless such change is made pursuant to the reprogramming or transfer provisions of this or any 
other appropriations Act. 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 116-6, § 739, 133 Stat. 13, 197 (2019). 
 58. El Paso Cty. v. Trump, 407 F. Supp. 3d 655, 660–61 (W.D. Tex. 2019). 
 59. El Paso Cty. v. Trump, No. 19-51144, slip op. at 2 (5th Cir. Jan. 8, 2020). 
 60. U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 379 F. Supp. 3d 8, 13 (D.D.C. 2019). 
 61. U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, No. 19-5176, 2020 WL 1228477, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 13, 
2020). 
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Perhaps feeling vindicated by the litigation, President Trump is reportedly 
now planning to make similar transfers in 2020. According to news reports, the 
current plan is “to take $3.7 billion in military construction funding, slightly 
more than the $3.6 billion diverted in 2019.”62 In February 2020, the President 
gave formal notice to Congress of intent to transfer the funds.63 Two weeks later, 
the American Civil Liberties Union filed suit to challenge the transfer.64 
C.  TARIFFS 
Protecting American industry by limiting imports was another key theme 
of the 2016 campaign.65 The mechanism for doing so turned out to be section 
232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Section 232 provides a process 
whereby the President can limit the imports of any product for national security 
reasons based on a report from the Secretary of Commerce.66 If the President 
agrees that imports pose a threat to national security, the President must 
“determine the nature and duration of the action that, in the judgment of the 
President, must be taken to adjust the imports of the article and its derivatives so 
that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security.”67 This 
provision was used in twenty-four proceedings between its passage and 1994.68 
In the past twenty-five years, there have been only seven proceedings, five of 
them under Trump.69 
On March 8, 2018, President Trump made use of this authority to impose 
tariffs on imports of aluminum and steel.70 As the basis for this action, the 
declaration of a national emergency invoked factual findings made by the 
Commerce Secretary. As recounted in the President’s Proclamation, those 
findings were: 
[T]he present quantities of aluminum imports and the circumstances of global 
excess capacity for producing aluminum are “weakening our internal economy,” 
leaving the United States “almost totally reliant on foreign producers of primary 
aluminum” and “at risk of becoming completely reliant on foreign producers of 
 
 62. Nick Miroff, Trump Planning to Divert Additional $7.2 Billion in Pentagon Funds for Border Wall, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2020, 4:35 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/trump-planning-to-
divert-additional-72-billion-in-pentagon-funds-for-border-wall/2020/01/13/59080a3a-363d-11ea-bb7b-265f45 
54af6d_story.html. 
 63. Emily Cochrane, Administration to Divert Billions from Pentagon to Fund Border Wall, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/13/us/politics/border-wall-funds-pentagon.html. 
 64. ACLU Challenges New Border Wall Funds Transfer, ACLU (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/ 
press-releases/aclu-challenges-new-border-wall-funds-transfer. 
 65. Nick Corasaniti et al., Donald Trump Vows to Rip Up Trade Deals and Confront China, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/29/us/politics/donald-trump-trade-speech.html (“Mr. Trump, 
by contrast, has made blistering attacks on trade his primary economic theme. In his address he rejected the 
standard view that countries benefit by importing goods, arguing that globalization helped ‘the financial elite,’ 
while leaving ‘millions of our workers with nothing but poverty and heartache.’”). 
 66. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (2018). 
 67. Id. § 1862(c)(A)(1)(ii). 
 68. Simon Lester & Huan Zhu, A Proposal for “Rebalancing” to Deal with “National Security” Trade 
Restrictions, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1451, 1456 (2019). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Proclamation No. 9704, 3 C.F.R. 39 (2018); Proclamation No. 9705, 3 C.F.R. 46 (2018). 
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high-purity aluminum that is essential for key military and commercial systems.” 
Because of these risks, and the risk that the domestic aluminum industry would 
become “unable to satisfy existing national security needs or respond to a national 
security emergency that requires a large increase in domestic production,” and 
taking into account the close relation of the economic welfare of the Nation to our 
national security, the Secretary concluded that the present quantities and 
circumstances of aluminum imports threaten to impair the national security . . . .71 
Section 1862(d), which the Proclamation cites, follows a sentence about 
national defense needs and requires the President to further consider the 
relationship between national security and various economic factors.72 The same 
day, the President issued a similar proclamation covering imports of steel.73 In 
January of 2020, Trump issued an additional proclamation expanding the tariffs 
because the earlier efforts had been less successful than expected in expanding 
the domestic industries.74 
Steel industry members challenged the constitutionality of section 232 on 
the grounds that it provided no limits on the President’s discretion in determining 
the existence of a threat or devising an appropriate remedy. The Court of 
International Trade rejected this claim. The court did agree with the government 
that Congress had committed these issues to the President’s discretion and 
thereby “precluded an inquiry for rationality, fact finding, or abuse of 
discretion.”75 This holding seems to be in line with the general reluctance of the 
courts to review emergency or national security declarations.76 Admittedly, the 
court said, “the broad guideposts of subsections (c) and (d) of section 232 bestow 
flexibility on the President and seem to invite the President to regulate commerce 
by way of means reserved for Congress, leaving very few tools beyond his 
reach.”77 Although in theory a presidential action could be reversed if it was 
 
 71. Proclamation No. 9704, 3 C.F.R. 39, 39–40 (2018). 
 72. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d) contains the following language regarding economic factors: 
In the administration of this section, the Secretary and the President shall further recognize the 
close relation of the economic welfare of the Nation to our national security, and shall take into 
consideration the impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare of individual domestic 
industries; and any substantial unemployment, decrease in revenues of government, loss of skills 
or investment, or other serious effects resulting from the displacement of any domestic products 
by excessive imports shall be considered, without excluding other factors, in determining whether 
such weakening of our internal economy may impair the national security. 
19 U.S.C. § 1862(d). 
 73. Proclamation No. 9705, 3 C.F.R. 46 (2018). The steel and aluminum tariffs were part of a slew of tariff 
increases by the Trump Administration. See BROCK R. WILLIAMS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45529, 
TRUMP ADMINISTRATION TARIFF ACTIONS (SECTIONS 201, 232, AND 301): FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 
(2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45529. 
 74. Proclamation No. 9980, 85 Fed. Reg. 5,281, 5,283 (Jan. 29, 2020). 
 75. Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1343 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019). The 
Court of International Trade is an Article III court with jurisdiction over all cases involving trade rules. Its 
judgments can be appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. About the Court, U.S. COURT 
OF INT’L TRADE, https://www.cit.uscourts.gov/about-court (last visited June 28, 2020). 
 76. See Sardino v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 361 F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. 
Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 581 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Spawr Optical Research, Inc., 685 F.2d 1076, 
1080 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 77. Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, 376 F. Supp. 3d at 1344. 
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based wholly on factors other than national security, “identifying the line 
between regulation of trade in furtherance of national security and an 
impermissible encroachment into the role of Congress could be elusive in some 
cases because judicial review would allow neither an inquiry into the President’s 
motives nor a review of his fact-finding.”78 And indeed, the national security 
rationale seems to have been flimsy. The Secretary of Defense had expressed 
concern about the effect of the tariffs on allies and noted that defense use was 
only a tiny fraction of domestic production.79 In addition, the President’s 
informal comments on the tariffs focused on trade policy more generally, rather 
than national security. 
Although the court seemed sympathetic to the concern over excessive 
delegation, its rejection of the nondelegation argument seems all but 
inescapable. In an earlier case involving section 362, the Supreme Court had 
squarely rejected any possible nondelegation argument: 
It establishes clear preconditions to Presidential action—inter alia, a finding by 
the Secretary of the Treasury that an “article is being imported into the United 
States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the 
national security.” Moreover, the leeway that the statute gives the President in 
deciding what action to take in the event the preconditions are fulfilled is far from 
unbounded. The President can act only to the extent “he deems necessary to adjust 
the imports of such article and its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten 
to impair the national security.” And § 232(c) . . . articulates a series of specific 
factors to be considered by the President in exercising his authority under 
§ 232(b).80 
In July 2018, the Republican Senate passed a resolution calling for limits 
on the use of section 232.81 Trump was clearly undaunted. On August 10, 2018, 
he modified the original March 8, 2018 Proclamation by increasing tariffs on 
steel from Turkey to fifty percent.82 Turkey had been listed in the Secretary of 
Commerce’s prior report as one of several countries that might be given a higher 
tariff if the President determined that not all countries should face the same 
tariff.83 The Proclamation explained that “imports have not declined as much as 
anticipated and capacity utilization has not increased to that target level,” and 
that the Secretary of Commerce had advised the President that raising the tariff 
on Turkey would be a “significant step toward ensuring the viability of the 
domestic steel industry.”84 Consequently, the President had “concluded that it is 
necessary and appropriate in light of our national security interests to adjust the 
 
 78. Id. at 1344–45. 
 79. Lester & Zhu, supra note 68, at 1458. 
 80. Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 559 (1976). 
 81. Peter Bettencourt, “Essentially Limitless”: Restraining Administrative Overreach Under Section 232, 
17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 711, 717 (2019). Bettencourt criticizes such use of section 232 on several grounds, 
including that “designating imports from strategic allies as threats to national security harms important security 
relationships.” Id. at 719. This was not the only modification Trump made in the original tariffs, but it was the 
only one relevant to the litigation. 
 82. Proclamation No. 9772, 3 C.F.R. 204 (2018). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
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tariff imposed by previous proclamations.”85 No explanation was given for 
imposing the higher tariff solely on Turkey. 
On May 16, 2019, the press reported that the “U.S. announced a rollback 
of steel tariffs against Turkey that it originally levied in August as trade and 
diplomatic relations deteriorated because of Turkey’s economic crisis and a row 
over the Turkish government’s detention of an American pastor.”86 The rationale 
was that “imports of steel articles have declined by 12 percent in 2018 compared 
to 2017 and imports of steel articles from Turkey have declined by 48 percent in 
2018, with the result that the domestic industry’s capacity utilization has 
improved at this point to approximately the target level recommended in the 
Secretary’s report.”87 
Then on October 14, 2019, Trump withdrew from trade negotiations with 
the Turkish government and said he would again increase the tariff to fifty 
percent. The proposed increase was due to the Turkish incursion into Kurdish-
controlled areas of Syria. Trump said: “The United States will aggressively use 
economic sanctions to target those who enable, facilitate and finance these 
heinous acts in Syria.”88 He added that he was “fully prepared to swiftly destroy 
Turkey’s economy if Turkish leaders continue down this dangerous and 
destructive path.”89 Ten days later, Trump lifted all sanctions, “declaring success 
for his policy despite a widespread belief among lawmakers of his own party 
and foreign policy experts that the U.S. withdrawal from the region has been a 
victory for Turkey and Russia.”90 It does not appear that any action had been 
taken under section 232 in the interim. However, Trump announced a national 
emergency regarding the situation in Syria and authorized sanctions against 
individuals.91 
The following month, the Court of International Trade placed limits on 
Trump’s authority.92 The plaintiff argued that Trump’s tariff increase violated 
both the Equal Protection Clause and section 232. As to the Equal Protection 
claim, the court noted that the Proclamation was subject only to the extremely 
lenient rational basis test, but nevertheless that the plaintiff had enough of a 
claim to survive dismissal: “Given this standard, it is difficult to imagine 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Joe Deaux, Trump Cuts Tariffs on Turkish Steel Imports in Half, to 25%, BLOOMBERG (May 16, 2019, 
6:08 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-17/trump-cuts-tariffs-on-turkish-steel-imports-
in-half-to-25. 
 87. Proclamation No. 9886, 84 Fed. Reg. 23,421, 23,421–22 (May 16, 2019). 
 88. Alan Rappeport & Michael Crowley, Trump Imposes Sanctions on Turkey as Syria Conflict Intensifies, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/us/politics/trump-turkey-tariffs.html. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Noah Bierman, Trump Lifts Turkey Sanctions, Declaring Success in Syria as Turkey and Russia Fill 
Void, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-10-23/trump-lifts-sanctions-
against-turkey. 
 91. Exec. Order No. 13894, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,851, 55,851 (Oct. 17, 2019). This executive order cited a raft 
of statutory authority, including “the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) 
(IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), section 212(f) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code.” Id. 
 92. Transpacific Steel LLC v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1274–76 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019). 
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Presidential action in connection with section 232 where one would be at a loss 
to conjure a rational justification; yet, the reality of this case proves otherwise. 
Defendants submit no set of facts that justify identifying importers of steel from 
Turkey as a class of one.”93 As the court explained, the government’s claim that 
“it is rational to ‘confront the national security threat from imports from all 
countries by specifically targeting countries’ with high import volumes or 
numerous AD/CVD orders, does not explain what differentiates Turkey from 
other similarly situated countries—for the President to target alone.”94 The court 
pointed out that, according to the Secretary of Commerce’s original report, five 
countries had higher volumes than Turkey of steel imports into the United 
States.95 
The court also held that the President could not increase or extend tariffs 
after the statutory deadline for action on the Secretary of Commerce’s report: 
The procedural safeguards in section 232 do not merely roadmap action; they 
are constraints on power. The Supreme Court has made clear that section 232 
avoids running afoul of the non-delegation doctrine because it establishes “clear 
preconditions to Presidential action.” The time limits, in particular, compel the 
President to do all that he can do immediately, and tie presidential action to the 
investigative and consultative safeguards. If the President could act beyond the 
prescribed time limits, the investigative and consultative provisions would become 
mere formalities detached from Presidential action. However, Congress 
affirmatively linked the investigative and consultative safeguards to Presidential 
action, and Congress strengthened that link when it imposed time limits on the 
President’s discretion to take action.96 
Despite this decision, the President continued to issue proclamations adjusting 
the tariffs set by the March 2018 proclamations. In January 2020, the President 
extended tariffs to certain products made with aluminum and steel in order to 
prevent circumvention of the earlier tariff proclamations for these metals.97 
D.  THE TRAVEL BAN 
At the beginning of Trump’s presidency, he imposed a ban on travel from 
certain countries.98 Litigation resulted in two further iterations of the ban. Each 
 
 93. Id. at 1272. 
 94. Id. at 1273. 
 95. Id. at 1272. 
 96. Id. at 1275–76 (citations omitted). A concurring opinion pointed to the case as illustrating the excessive 
delegation made section 232, referring to a prior dubitante opinion by the same judge. 
I respectfully suggested that section 232, lacking ascertainable standards, “provides virtually 
unbridled discretion to the President with respect to the power over trade that is reserved by the 
Constitution to Congress,” in violation of the separation of powers. “[T]he fullness of time” and 
“real recent actions” may provide an empirical basis to revisit assumptions and inform 
understanding of the statute. 
  I submit that the case before us may well yield further evidence of the infirmity of the statute. 
Id. at 1277 (Katzmann, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Am. Inst. for Int’l 
Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1352 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019) (Katzmann, J., dubitante)). 
 97. Proclamation No. 9980, 85 Fed. Reg. 5,281, 5,283 (Jan. 29, 2020). 
 98. Mashaw and Berke succinctly describe the issuance of the order and its aftermath: 
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of these bans was issued pursuant to authority vested in the President by section 
212(f) of the Immigration and Nationalization Act of 1952: 
  Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of 
aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United 
States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, 
suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or 
nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to 
be appropriate.99 
Added by a later amendment to the 1952 Act, section 1182(a)(3) requires 
that immigration officials bar entry into this country to an alien for whom there 
is “reasonable ground to believe” that he or she “is likely to engage after entry 
in any [specifically defined] terrorist activity.”100 
In reviewing Trump’s executive orders to halt travel from designated 
countries, the lower courts cast doubt on his invocation of national security as a 
basis for the orders. In International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, the 
Fourth Circuit concluded that the actions were motivated by religious animus 
toward Muslims and consequently violated the Establishment Clause.101 The 
court quoted extensively from Trump’s statements as a candidate and from 
statements by himself and his advisors after he took office.102 The Ninth Circuit 
took a different approach in Hawaii v. Trump, holding that the orders were 
defective because Trump had failed to articulate a bona fide national security 
justification for his sweeping action.103 The Supreme Court stayed part of the 
lower court orders but allowed them to stand to the extent they applied to 
individuals with significant ties to the U.S.104 
Trump pushed back against the lower court rulings, not only through legal 
channels but on social media. When a lower court judge issued a temporary stay 
of his travel order, Trump denigrated him on Twitter as a “so-called judge” and 
 
The nation’s airports were filled with “confusion and chaos and protests” as immigrants and 
refugees with previously valid travel documents were detained at U.S. airports, while others were 
prevented from boarding planes into the United States. The chaotic implementation stemmed at 
least in part from the furtive and rushed legal process behind the order. Allegedly, neither the DHS 
secretary nor the Secretary of Defense was involved in any legal review of the original EO. Instead, 
a “small White House team” led by Steve Bannon drafted the Order in relative secrecy. Even 
Republican congressmen criticized the dearth of legal process. 
Mashaw & Berke, supra note 2, at 569 (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Yeganeh Torbati et al., Chaos, Anger 
as Trump Order Halts Some Muslim Immigrants, REUTERS (Jan. 28, 2017, 7:48 AM), https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-usa-trump-immigration-chaos/chaos-anger-as-trump-order-halts-some-muslim-immigrants-idUSKB 
N15C0LD; then quoting Michael D. Shear & Ron Nixon, How Trump’s Rush to Enact an Immigration Ban 
Unleashed Global Chaos, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/us/politics/donald-
trump-rush-immigration-order-chaos.html). 
 99. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2018). 
 100. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(II). 
 101. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 572 (4th Cir.) (en banc), vacated and 
remanded by 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.). 
 102. Id. at 575-77. 
 103. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 755-56 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), vacated and remanded by, Trump v. 
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017) (mem.). 
 104. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (2017). 
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said the ruling “essentially takes law-enforcement away from our country, is 
ridiculous and will be overturned!”105 He followed up by saying: “Just cannot 
believe a judge would put our country in such peril. If something happens blame 
him and court system. People pouring in. Bad!”106 Such comments were 
sufficiently unusual to prompt his own nominee at the time for the Supreme 
Court, Neil Gorsuch, to refer to them as “disheartening” and “demoralizing.”107 
The final version of Trump’s order was issued in September of 2017.108 It 
imposed severe limits on entry into the United States by residents of seven 
countries: Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen.109 The 
limits were based on deficiencies in their “identity-management and 
information-sharing capabilities, protocols, and practices.”110 By the third 
iteration, the process within the Administration had become more regularized 
and the ban was more carefully drafted, but that was an after-the-fact response 
to litigation. In Trump v Hawaii, this third iteration of the ban was challenged as 
beyond the President’s statutory authority and a violation of the Establishment 
Clause due to anti-Muslim motivation.111 
The majority dismissed each of these challenges. The language of the 
statute, in the Court’s view, “exudes deference to the President in every 
clause.”112 The Court also noted that in “borrowing ‘nearly verbatim’” from an 
earlier statute, “Congress made one critical alteration—it removed the national 
emergency standard . . . .”113 The plaintiffs also relied on a provision that was 
added to the Immigration Act in the 1960s. Congress amended the INA in 1965 
to eliminate the “national origins system as the basis for the selection of 
immigrants to the United States.”114 Section 1152(a)(1)(A) provides that: “[N]o 
person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in the 
issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, 
place of birth, or place of residence.”115 The plaintiffs argued that this made 
nationality alone an insufficient basis for exclusion. But this, too, the Court 
found unpersuasive. Entitlement to a visa does not guarantee admission into the 
country.116 
 
 105. Brian Bennett, Trump Attacks Federal Judges in Unusually Personal Terms, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2017, 
2:45 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-travel-ban-20170208-story.html. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Abby Phillip et al., Supreme Court Nominee Gorsuch Says Trump’s Attacks on Judiciary Are 
“Demoralizing”, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-nom 
inee-gorsuch-says-trumps-attacks-on-judiciary-are-demoralizing/2017/02/08/64e03fe2-ee3f-11e6-9662-6eedf 
1627882_story.html?utm_term=.4b45b2355cac. 
 108. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017). 
 109. Id. at 45,163. 
 110. Id. at 45,161. 
 111. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403, 2406 (2018). 
 112. Id. at 2408. 
 113. Id. at 2412. 
 114. H.R. REP. NO. 89-745, at 8 (1965). 
 115. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) (2018). 
 116. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2414. 
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The Court then turned to the Establishment Clause issue. Importantly, the 
Court made no effort to minimize the evidence of discriminatory intent. It 
acknowledged a series of statements by the President or his aides demonstrating 
anti-Muslim animus: 
1. [W]hile a candidate on the campaign trail, the President published a 
“Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration” that called for a “total 
and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our 
country’s representatives can figure out what is going on.” 
2. Then-candidate Trump also stated that “Islam hates us” and asserted that 
the United States was “having problems with Muslims coming into the 
country.” 
3. Shortly after being elected, when asked whether violence in Europe had 
affected his plans to “ban Muslim immigration,” the President replied, 
“You know my plans. All along, I’ve been proven to be right.” 
4. [When the first version of the travel ban was issued,] one of the 
President’s campaign advisers explained that when the President “first 
announced it, he said, ‘Muslim ban.’ He called me up. He said, ‘Put a 
commission together. Show me the right way to do it legally.’” 
5. [After issuing the second version of the ban,] the President expressed 
regret that his prior order had been “watered down” and called for a 
“much tougher version” of his “Travel Ban.” 
6. Shortly before the release of the final version of the ban, “he stated that 
the “travel ban . . . should be far larger, tougher, and more specific,” but 
“stupidly that would not be politically correct.” 
7. More recently, on November 29, 2017, the President retweeted links to 
three anti-Muslim propaganda videos.117 
Due to the deference given to the President in foreign affairs and national 
security, however, the majority held that its review was limited to determining 
whether the Proclamation set forth a rational basis for the action, and concluded 
that it did.118 The Court held that the policy might be considered overbroad and 
ineffective in serving national security. Yet the Court declined to rule on that 
basis, stating, “[We] cannot substitute our own assessment for the Executive’s 
predictive judgments on such matters, all of which ‘are delicate, complex, and 
involve large elements of prophecy.’”119 
In defending his actions, the President enjoyed several advantages: the 
breadth of the statutory language, the tradition of deference in foreign affairs and 
national security, and the general weakness of constitutional constraints on 
immigration policy. Thus, his ultimate victory in the Supreme Court was not 
shocking. What made the case distinctive, however, was just how blatant the 
pretextual nature of the purported security justification (inadequate vetting) was. 
 
 117. Id. at 2417 (citations omitted). On the general issue of how courts should evaluate the relevance of 
presidential statements, see Katherine Shaw, Beyond the Bully Pulpit: Presidential Speech in the Courts, 96 
TEX. L. REV. 71 (2017). Shaw views such speech as legally relevant under some circumstances, including “where 
presidential speech touches on matters of foreign affairs, or where government purpose is a component of a legal 
test and presidential statements may supply relevant evidence of that purpose.” Id. at 77. 
 118. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2420. 
 119. Id. at 2421 (quoting Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)). 
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Even so, it is notable that by the time the case got to the Supreme Court, the 
Administration had been forced to refine both the order itself and the supporting 
justification considerably—and even so, it won only by a single vote. 
E.  PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS AND DEREGULATION 
The next study involves a more frequent but less dramatic situation. The 
Administrative Procedure Act requires that before issuing a rule, an agency 
provide notice and an opportunity to comment.120 However, it may skip these 
procedural steps “when the agency for good causes finds . . . that notice and 
public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the 
public interest.”121 The Trump Administration has made numerous efforts to 
suspend or delay regulations without engaging in notice and comment.122 Many 
of these efforts were prompted by a January 20, 2017 memorandum from then-
White House Chief of Staff Reince Priebus directing agency heads to 
“temporarily postpone [the] effective dates for 60 days” of regulations that had 
been promulgated but not yet taken effect.123 The Priebus Memorandum also 
directed agency heads to “consider proposing for notice and comment a rule to 
delay the effective date for regulations beyond that 60-day period.”124 
In many cases, the purported good cause was that there was no time to 
engage in notice and comment before the effective date of a regulation adopted 
during the Obama Administration.125 Other regulatory suspensions were said to 
be urgent because of the need for industry to plan effectively.126 Other reasons 
for dispensing with notice and comment included limited resources and staff to 
conduct a fuller procedure,127 and the interest of a new Administration in 
reconsidering actions taken by the law.128 
The judicial reception of these arguments has been somewhat chilly. NRDC 
v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration involved the delay of an 
inflation adjustment to penalties for violating fuel efficiency rules.129 The court 
summarized the applicable legal standard as applying in three circumstances: (1) 
“emergency situations in which a rule would respond to an immediate threat to 
safety, such as to air travel, or when immediate implementation of a rule might 
directly impact public safety,” (2) insignificant routine matters, and (3) when 
“the use of notice and comment must actually harm the public interest.”130 The 
court rejected the agency’s attempted justifications. True, the court said, the 
 
 120. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2018). 
 121. Id. § 553(b)(B). 
 122. See Lisa Heinzerling, Unreasonable Delays: The Legal Problems (So Far) of Trump’s Deregulatory 
Binge, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 35 (2018). 
 123. Memorandum from Reince Priebus, supra note 1. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Heinzerling, supra note 122, at 35 n.123 (citing numerous examples). 
 126. Id. at 37. 
 127. Id. at 39. 
 128. Id. at 41. 
 129. NRDC v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 894 F.3d 95, 113 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 130. Id. at 114. 
July 2020] EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES 1163 
effective date of the pending inflation adjustment was imminent, but that was 
only because of the agency’s prior delays. The court stressed the importance of 
notice and comment as a basis for reasoned decision making.131 “That a 
regulated entity might prefer different regulations that are easier or less costly to 
comply with,” the court observed, “does not justify dispensing with notice and 
comment.”132 In short, there was no “emergency or other extraordinary 
circumstance” justifying the failure to observe procedural requirements.133 
East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump134 arose in a more dramatic setting. 
Rather than being a challenge to a delay of some existing rule, it involved a 
stringent restriction on asylum seekers. Issued in tandem with a presidential 
proclamation, the rule in question made asylum unavailable to any alien seeking 
refuge in the United States after entering the country from Mexico outside a 
lawful port of entry.135 The court rejected the argument that there was good cause 
to dispense with notice and comment.136 The government argued that 
announcing a proposed rule would result in a surge of illegal border crossings.137 
The court considered this implausible: 
[W]e would need to accept the Government’s contention that the “very 
announcement” of the Rule itself would give aliens a reason to “surge” across the 
southern border in numbers greater than is currently the case. Absent additional 
evidence, this inference is too difficult to credit. Indeed, even the Government 
admits that it cannot “determine how . . . entry proclamations involving the 
southern border could affect the decision calculus for various categories of aliens 
planning to enter.” Because the Government’s reasoning is only speculative at this 
juncture, we conclude that the district court’s holding is correct.138 
 
 131. The court explained that: 
Notice and comment are not mere formalities. They are basic to our system of administrative law. 
They serve the public interest by providing a forum for the robust debate of competing and 
frequently complicated policy considerations having far-reaching implications and, in so doing, 
foster reasoned decisionmaking. These premises apply with full force to this case. This is not a 
situation of acute health or safety risk requiring immediate administrative action. And it is not a 
situation in which surprise to the industry is required to preempt manipulative tactics. 
Id. at 115. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742, 755 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 135. Id. at 754–55; see also Proclamation No. 9822, 3 C.F.R. 284 (2019); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208, 1003, 1208 
(2019). 
 136. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 932 F.3d at 777–78. 
 137. Id. at 777. The government also argued that its finding of urgency was entitled to judicial deference 
because “courts cannot ‘second-guess’ the reason for invoking the good cause exception as long as the reason is 
‘rational.’ But an agency invoking the good cause exception must ‘make a sufficient showing that good cause 
exist[s].’” Id. at 778 n.16 (alteration in original) (quoting Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Evans, 316 F.3d 904, 
912 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 138. Id. at 777–78 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). The dissenter saw more need for urgent action: 
The Attorney General articulated a need to act immediately in the interests of safety of both law 
enforcement and aliens, and the Rule involves actions of aliens at the southern border undermining 
particularized determinations of the President judged as required by the national interest, relations 
with Mexico, and the President’s foreign policy. 
Id. at 780 (Leavy, J., dissenting in part). 
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This rejection of Administration claims of exceptional circumstances is 
echoed in other judicial opinions.139 As two recent commentators summarize the 
litigation, “[m]ultiple agencies issuing these suspensions failed to follow the 
requirements established by law and the courts have repeatedly ruled against the 
Trump administration after finding both procedural and substantive violations,” 
including having “no excuse for failing to go through notice and comment for 
the suspensions.”140 They also note that “in several cases, the Trump 
administration withdrew suspensions issued without notice and comment after 
being sued.”141 
F.  THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC 
The coronavirus outbreak in the United States erupted while this Essay was 
already in the publication process. At present, both the pandemic and the federal 
response are still on-going stories. This Section will discuss how emergency 
powers have figured in the federal response through early April of 2020. 
A new form of viral pneumonia was first reported to the World Health 
Organization’s Chinese office on New Year’s Eve of 2019.142 Three weeks later, 
the first U.S. case was reported.143 Within ten days after that, the first person-to-
person spread had been confirmed,144 and a month later, the first case of 
community spread was reported.145 The exponential spread of the virus had 
begun. By the end of the following month, March 2020, over fifty thousand cases 
of infection had been detected, and over seven hundred Americans had died.146 
For a considerable period of time, President Trump downplayed the 
seriousness of the health threat. In a January 22 interview, he said, “[W]e have 
it totally under control. It’s one person coming in from China, and we have it 
 
 139. See, e.g., California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2018); Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n v. Duke, 291 
F. Supp. 3d 5 (D.D.C. 2017); Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F. Supp. 3d 553, 572 (E.D. Pa. 2017), aff’d sub nom. 
Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 930 F.3d 543, 567 (3d Cir. 2019), as amended (July 18, 2019), cert. granted sub 
nom. Trump v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 918 (2020) (mem.). In Pennsylvania v. President U.S., the government 
now contends that the lack of notice and comment was subsequently cured. Reply Brief for Federal Appellants 
at 2–3, Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 930 F.3d 543 (2019) (Nos. 17-3752, 18-1253, 19-1129, and 19-1189). 
 140. Bethany A. Davis Noll & Richard L. Revesz, Regulation in Transition, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1, 39 (2019). 
 141. Id. Noll and Revesz emphasize the sloppiness of the Trump Administration’s efforts and argue that 
“[a]gencies under Trump tripped up on basic procedural rules such as notice-and-comment requirements.” Id. at 41. 
 142. Rolling Updates on Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/ 
emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/events-as-they-happen (last updated June 17, 2020). 
 143. Press Release, CDC, First Travel-Related Case of 2019 Novel Coronavirus Detected in United States 
(Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/p0121-novel-coronavirus-travel-case.html. 
 144. Press Release, CDC, CDC Confirms Person-to-Person Spread of New Coronavirus in the United States 
(Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/p0130-coronavirus-spread.html. 
 145. Sarah Moon et al., The CDC Has Changed Its Criteria for Testing Patients for Coronavirus After the 
First Case of Unknown Origin Was Confirmed, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/27/health/us-cases-
coronavirus-community-transmission/index.html (last updated Feb. 28, 2020). 
 146. Cases in the US, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html 
(last updated June 28, 2020). By late June 2020, as this Essay goes to press, more than 2.5 million cases have 
been detected, and over 125,000 Americans have died. Id. 
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under control. It’s going to be just fine.”147 In early March, he continued to insist 
that there was little problem, saying, “It’s very mild,” “I’m not concerned at all,” 
and “It will go away. Just say calm. It will go away.”148 Trump also touted his 
own innate ability as an epidemiologist: “I like this stuff. I really get it. People 
are surprised that I understand it. Every one of these doctors said, ‘How do you 
know so much about this?’ Maybe I have a natural ability. Maybe I should have 
done that instead of running for president.”149 
Trump was reluctant to invoke emergency powers in response to the 
growing public health crisis. By March 13, there were over 1600 confirmed 
cases and over forty deaths, accompanied by a ten percent single-day drop in the 
stock market.150 Even so, Trump suggested that declaring a national emergency 
was not a significant step. Doing so, he said, could be useful for “some of the 
more minor things at this point. But, you know, look, we’re in great shape. 
Compared to other places, we are in really good shape, and we want to keep it 
that way.”151 Trump’s reluctance to issue a declaration was attributed in part to 
a division among his top advisors (none of whom were disaster relief or public 
health experts), and partly to an unwillingness to court the embarrassment of 
calling an emergency after long denying the magnitude of the problem.152 On 
February 19, he told a television station, “I think the numbers are going to get 
progressively better as we go along.”153 
Nevertheless, Trump did ultimately declare emergencies under both the 
National Emergencies Act154 and the Stafford Act.155 The National Emergencies 
 
 147. David Leonhardt, A Complete List of Trump’s Attempts to Play Down Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15/opinion/trump-coronavirus.html. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. James Hohmann, The Daily 202: Democrats Want Trump to Declare the Coronavirus Outbreak a 
National Emergency. He’s Hesitating, WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
powerpost/paloma/daily-202/2020/03/13/daily-202-democrats-want-trump-to-declare-the-coronavirus-
outbreak-a-national-emergency-he-shesitating/5e6b2586602ff10d49acacc8/. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Leonhardt, supra note 147. 
 154. Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337, 15,337 (Mar. 18, 2020). The basis for the emergency was 
that, while hospitals and medical facilities had the duty of being prepared to “surge capacity and capability,” 
“[a]dditional measures . . . are needed to successfully contain and combat the virus in the United States.” Id. 
 155. Section 501(b) of the Stafford Act authorizes the President to declare an emergency “when he 
determines that an emergency exists for which the primary responsibility for response rests with the United 
States because the emergency involves a subject area for which, under the Constitution or laws of the United 
States, the United States exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility and authority.” 42 U.S.C. § 5191(b) 
(2018). Section 502(1) defines an “emergency” as: 
[A]ny occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, Federal assistance is 
needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property 
and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the 
United States. 
42 U.S.C. § 5122(1) (2018). President Trump’s emergency declaration under the Stafford Act is contained in a 
letter to state governors. Letter from President Donald J. Trump on Emergency Determination Under the Stafford 
Act (Mar. 13, 2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/letter-president-donald-j-trump-
emergency-determination-stafford-act/. The asserted ground for the emergency declaration was as follows: 
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Act was discussed earlier. The Stafford Act is primarily concerned with disaster 
relief after natural disasters, but declaring an emergency under the Act did 
unlock some federal funds to assist states.156 
One consequence of the declaration under the National Emergencies Act is 
to authorize the President to make use of the Defense Production Act (DFA),157 
a Korean War-era law that gives the government the ability to control production 
and distribution of vital material during a national emergency. President Trump 
did issue a proclamation that the Act was in effect on March 18, 2020.158 Until 
March 2020, however, he had refused to take any action under the DFA, despite 
the pleas of state and local officials.159 He finally invoked the DFA to require 
General Motors to supply ventilators on March 27.160 
In addition, to declare a national emergency under the Stafford Act, 
President Trump later issued “major disaster” declarations under the Act for 
 
Only the Federal Government can provide the necessary coordination to address a pandemic of this 
national size and scope caused by a pathogen introduced into our country. It is the preeminent 
responsibility of the Federal Government to take action to stem a nationwide pandemic that has its 
origins abroad, which implicates its authority to regulate matters related to interstate matters and 
foreign commerce and to conduct the foreign relations of the United States. 
Id. 
 156. For detailed discussion of the operation of the Stafford Act, see DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., DISASTER 
LAW AND POLICY (3d ed. 2015). 
 157. 50 U.S.C. §§ 4501–4658 (2018). The Congressional Research Service summarizes the Act as follows: 
Congress has found that “the security of the United States is dependent on the ability of the 
domestic industrial base to supply materials and services for the national defense and to prepare 
for and respond to military conflicts, natural or man-caused disasters, or acts of terrorism within 
the United States.” Through the DPA, the President can, among other activities, prioritize 
government contracts for goods and services over competing customers, and offer incentives within 
the domestic market to enhance the production and supply of critical materials and technologies 
when necessary for national defense. 
MICHAEL H. CECIRE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43767, THE DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950: 
HISTORY, AUTHORITIES, AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS 1 (updated Mar. 2, 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/ 
crs/natsec/R43767.pdf (footnote omitted) (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 4502(a)(1)). 
 158. Executive Order No. 13909, 85 Fed. Reg. 16,227, 16,227 (Mar. 23, 2020). The order states that: 
 To ensure that our healthcare system is able to surge capacity and capability to respond to the 
spread of COVID-19, it is critical that all health and medical resources needed to respond to the 
spread of COVID-19 are properly distributed to the Nation’s healthcare system and others that 
need them most at this time. 
Authority to implement the executive order is delegated to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Id. 
 159.  Jeanne Whalen et al., Scramble for Medical Equipment Descends into Chaos as U.S. States and 
Hospitals Compete for Rare Supplies, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2020, 5:08 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
business/2020/03/24/scramble-medical-equipment-descends-into-chaos-us-states-hospitals-compete-rare-
supplies/?utm_campaign=wp_to_your_health&utm_content=2020_03_25&utm_medium=email&utm_source=
newsletter&wpisrc=nl_tyh&wpmk=1 (“The market for medical supplies has descended into chaos, according to 
state officials and health-care leaders. They are begging the federal government to use a wartime law to bring 
order and ensure the United States has the gear it needs to battle the coronavirus. So far, the Trump administration 
has declined.”). 
 160. John Wagner & Corby Itkowitz, Trump Orders GM to Manufacture Ventilators Under the Defense 
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California, New York, and Washington State at the request of their governors.161 
The governors had sought this designation because considerably more federal 
support can be accessed for a major disaster than for a national emergency under 
the Stafford Act.162 But only limited funds were released, leaving governors 
deeply dissatisfied, with the Governor of Washington complaining that the 
declaration failed to “unlock many forms of federal assistance we have requested 
to help workers.”163 
There is actually considerable legal doubt about whether an infectious 
disease can qualify as a major disaster. The legal issue is whether the definition 
of major disaster can include a pandemic. The statute defines a major disaster as 
“any natural catastrophe” that the President thinks is bad enough to require 
federal assistance to supplement the efforts of states, local governments, and 
disaster relief organizations.164 But is a pandemic a “natural catastrophe”? 
The term “natural catastrophe” is ambiguous. But the parenthetical 
immediately after the reference to catastrophes in section 5122(2) of the Stafford 
Act undermines the claim that infectious diseases qualify for the designation. 
The statute provides that “natural catastrophe” includes “any hurricane, tornado, 
storm, high water, winddriven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic 
eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought.” Fires, floods, and 
explosions are also covered, regardless of cause. This long list of examples 
indicates that what Congress had in mind were large-scale physical events like 
hurricanes and explosions. A disease may be natural and it may be a catastrophe, 
but it is a biological rather than physical threat. So the thrust of the language 
seems to be that the statute addresses something very different than diseases. 
On the other hand, the statute is not completely unambiguous. It says that 
natural catastrophes include all of those events, which suggests that other types 
of events might be covered as well. Merriam-Webster’s first definition of 
“catastrophe” is “a momentous tragic event ranging from extreme misfortune to 
 
 161. Rebecca Rainey, Trump Hasn’t Yet Released Disaster Unemployment Funds, POLITICO, https://www. 
politico.com/news/2020/03/24/trump-disaster-unemployment-funds-147404 (last updated Mar. 24, 2020). 
 162. Under the Stafford Act, declaring a major disaster unlocks greater powers than declaring a national 
emergency. In contrast to a disaster declaration, a national emergency “would not authorize grants, 
unemployment assistance, food coupons, crisis counseling assistance and training, or community disaster loans 
as would be available through a major disaster declaration.” EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34724, 
WOULD AN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC QUALIFY AS A MAJOR DISASTER UNDER THE STAFFORD ACT? 2 (Oct. 20, 
2008), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34724.pdf. 
 163. Rainey, supra note 161. 
 164. Section 5122(2) defines a “major disaster” as: 
[A]ny natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, winddriven water, 
tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), 
or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the 
determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major 
disaster assistance under this chapter to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, 
local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or 
suffering caused thereby. 
42 U.S.C. § 5122(2) (2018). 
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utter overthrow or ruin.”165 That fits the coronavirus. However, the third 
definition is a “violent and sudden change in a feature of the earth” or “ a violent 
usually destructive natural event (such as a supernova).”166 The statutory 
examples seem closer to the third definition. 
In practical terms, the legality of the disaster limitations may have limited 
significance. It is difficult to see how anyone would have standing to challenge 
a grant of funds for a major disaster. If such a challenge were brought, it is also 
unclear whether a court would be willing to scrutinize a presidential declaration. 
Putting aside the possibility of a judicial challenge, it is easy to understand 
the temptation to ignore legal technicalities to provider vitally needed assistance 
in the course of an emergency. It might have been better, however, to seek quick 
authorization from Congress, along with additional funding for the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to help it handle the additional 
responsibilities. 
Through the crisis, Trump has had an uneasy relationship with government 
medical experts. As one news source put it, the “spread of the deadly virus is 
thrusting Trump’s science and health experts into the uncomfortable role of 
carefully—but clearly—contradicting him by offering warnings, grounded in 
science, about the risks from the disease and recommending some Americans 
alter their daily routines.”167 For instance, on February 20, Trump told reporters 
that the disease was “very well under control in our country,” that the U.S. was 
“in very good shape,” and that “we’re fortunate so far . . . [and] we think it’s 
going to remain that way.”168 Within a few hours, “federal health officials 
warned that the spread of the virus was inevitable” and advised businesses to 
make plans for adapting.169 Dr. Anthony Fauci, the head of the National 
Institutes of Health division on infection diseases, found it necessary to 
repeatedly correct the President about medical matters at public briefing 
sessions; when queried by a reporter, Fauci said “I can't jump in front of the 
microphone and push him down,” leaving gentle corrections as the only 
alternative.170 
As this Essay goes to press, the coronavirus is still underway. The full story 
of the outbreak and of the government response remains to be finished. At this 
point, however, the outbreak sheds light on the risks of underuse of emergency 
powers in a severe crisis. 
 
 165. Catastrophe, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/catastrophe (last 
visited June 28, 2020). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Justin Sink & Mario Parker, Trump’s Coronavirus Claims Often Contradicted by His Own Experts, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-09/trump-s-coronavirus-claims-often-
contradicted-by-his-own-experts (last updated Mar. 9, 2020). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Justin Wise, Fauci on Trump Coronavirus Comments: “I Can’t Jump in Front of the Microphone and 
Push Him Down”, THE HILL (Mar. 23, 2020, 7:23 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/488961-
fauci-on-trump-coronavirus-comments-i-cant-jump-in-front-of-the. 
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II.  LOOKING AHEAD: A CLIMATE EMERGENCY? 
It is difficult to disentangle process issues from views about the merits of 
Trump’s actions. For that reason, it is useful to think about ways that a 
progressive in the White House might make use of emergency powers to address 
an issue such as climate change. Climate change and immigration are similar on 
at least one dimension: Both issues involve the country’s relations with the 
outside world, an area where presidential powers are strong. Moreover, neither 
of these are issues that have emerged suddenly and unexpectedly. The same is 
true of trade deficits and the changing energy mix on the grid. 
The case for the use of emergency action to address climate is actually 
more easily supported than with (say) immigration. The U.S. government has 
already classified climate change as a serious threat to American welfare and 
national security, and it is a threat that is getting stronger daily. Recent science 
indicates that climate action is even more urgent than we thought.171 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has made a formal finding, 
based on an exhaustive review of the scientific evidence, that greenhouse gases 
endanger human life and welfare both within the United States and globally. 
That finding was upheld by the D.C. Circuit.172 Moreover, national security 
agencies have consistently viewed climate change as a serious threat.173 In 
written testimony to Congress about threats to national security, the Trump 
Administration’s own Director of National Intelligence (DNI) discussed climate 
change.174 His discussion did not equivocate about the reality or dangers of 
climate change. Rather, he took the science, and the threat, seriously: 
The past 115 years have been the warmest period in the history of modern 
civilization, and the past few years have been the warmest years on record. 
Extreme weather events in a warmer world have the potential for greater impacts 
and can compound with other drivers to raise the risk of humanitarian disasters, 
conflict, water and food shortages, population migration, labor shortfalls, price 
shocks, and power outages. Research has not identified indicators of tipping points 
in climate-linked earth systems, suggesting a possibility of abrupt climate 
change.175 
Other parts of the government—though not, of course, President Trump—
have also recognized the threat of climate change to national security. The 
military has also taken a proactive stance on climate change. Former Secretary 
of Defense James Mattis was clear about the impact of climate change on 
national security: “Climate change is impacting stability in areas of the world 
 
 171. See Mark P. Nevitt, On Environmental Law, Climate Change, & National Security Law, 44 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (“[T]he window to solve this climate security crisis is rapidly closing.”). 
 172. Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam). 
 173. For a fuller discussion of the linkages between national security and climate change, see Nevitt, supra 
note 171, at 6–15, 24. 
 174. DANIEL R. COATS, OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD: 
WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 21–23 (Jan. 29, 2019), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf. 
 175. DANIEL R. COATS, OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD: 
WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 16 (Feb. 13, 2018), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---Unclassified-SSCI.pdf. 
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where our troops are operating today. . . . It is appropriate for the Combatant 
Commands to incorporate drivers of instability that impact the security 
environment in their areas into their planning.”176 Congress has also recognized 
climate change as a threat to national security and more specifically to military 
infrastructure and activities. The most significant action was the 2017 
Republican Congress’s passage of the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2018, H.R. 2810.177 The Act was a funding statute for the Pentagon. 
Section 335 of the Act states that “climate change is a direct threat to the national 
security of the United States and is impacting stability in areas of the world both 
where the United States Armed Forces are operating today, and where strategic 
implications for future conflict exist.”178 
What government powers would be unlocked by declaring a climate 
change emergency? One immediate possibility would be to use the same power 
that Trump has used in order to divert military construction funds to other uses—
in this case, perhaps building wind or solar farms or new transmission lines to 
make the grid more reliable and resilient in areas containing military facilities. 
It also seems possible that a progressive President could use emergency tariff 
powers to put limits on imports of goods whose production involved high levels 
of carbon emissions.179 It would be particularly easy to justify fees if they were 
used to shield U.S. firms subject to stricter carbon restrictions from competition 
from high-carbon jurisdictions. As we have seen, judicial review of actions by 
Trump using similar powers has been anemic at best. 
Some other possibilities can be gleaned from a useful list of emergency 
powers compiled by the Brennan Center.180 First, it might be possible to suspend 
 
 176. Andrew Revkin, Trump’s Defense Secretary Cites Climate Change as National Security Challenge, 
PROPUBLICA (Mar. 14, 2017, 11:17 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/trumps-defense-secretary-cites-
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oil leases offshore or on federal lands. These leases are required to have clauses 
allowing them to be suspended during national emergencies.181 Second, the 
President has emergency powers to respond to industrial shortfalls in national 
emergencies.182 This could be used to support expansion of battery or electrical 
vehicle production. A related provision allows the President to extend loan 
guarantees to critical industries during national emergencies.183 Third, the 
President may invoke the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to 
deal with “any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole 
or substantial part outside the United States.”184 That description certainly 
applies to climate change. According to the Brennan Center, this Act “confer[s] 
broad authority to regulate financial and other commercial transactions 
involving designated entities, including the power to impose sanctions on 
individuals and countries.”185 Finally, declaring a national emergency would 
allow the President to limit exports of oil to other countries.186 
In addition to these tangible benefits, declaring a climate emergency might 
also have an intangible one. It would be a strong signal that the United States 
recognizes the urgent need to cut carbon emissions—a signal to the international 
community as well as courts and agencies in the United States. Perhaps more 
importantly, it could highlight the importance and urgency of the issue within 
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the United States.187 From a newly elected President’s point of view, these 
actions also have the advantage that they could be accomplished at the beginning 
of an administration without the lengthy delays involved in legislation or agency 
regulations. 
Taken together, these actions would not amount to anything like a Green 
New Deal, but they could have a real impact on emissions. Because they are 
triggered by finding a national emergency, they involve minimal procedural 
requirements and limited opportunities for judicial review. For that reason, a 
progressive President might well find them appealing. In short, when assessing 
the desirability of using emergency powers, we need to keep in mind that this is 
a game both sides can play. If a progressive President were to follow Trump’s 
lead by making dramatic use of these powers, we could expect to see such 
actions becoming the new norm. On the other hand, failure to take such actions 
might be seen by some progressives as a default similar to Trump’s delayed 
response to the coronavirus outbreak. 
III.  UNILATERAL PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION IN PERSPECTIVE 
 Use of direct presidential action has to be evaluated within a broader 
consideration of presidential power. Expanding the President’s influence over 
regulation has long had its advocates. Justice Elena Kagan, in her earlier career 
as an academic, penned an enormously influential 2001 article about the 
increasingly dominant role of the President in regulation, at the expense of the 
autonomy of administrative agencies.188 The article’s thesis, simply stated, was 
that “[w]e live in an era of presidential administration,” by which she meant that 
the White House rather than administrative agencies had become the dominant 
force in controlling the direction of federal regulation.189 Kagan’s article did not 
simply document the emergence of presidential administration; it also celebrated 
this development. She argued that “in comparison with other forms of control, 
the new presidentialization of administration renders the bureaucratic sphere 
more transparent and responsive to the public, while also better promoting 
important kinds of regulatory competence and dynamism.”190 
Kagan admitted that presidential administration posed risks, but she argued 
that those risks were manageable. In turning to possible critiques of her position, 
Kagan contended that any tendency by presidents to push past the edges of 
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 189. Kagan, supra note 188, at 2246. 
 190. Id. at 2252. 
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legality can be combatted by the courts.191 As we have seen, this is less likely to 
be true when Presidents invoke emergency or national security authority. She 
also argued that the risk of displacing agency expertise was overblown by critics, 
although she recognized it as a possibility.192 Still, Kagan conceded, “[f]uture 
developments in the relationship between the President and the agencies may 
suggest different judicial responses; the practice of presidential control over 
administration likely will continue to evolve in ways that raise new issues and 
cast doubt on old conclusions.”193 
Kagan pointed to several advantages to presidential administration. To 
begin with, she argued, the President’s actions have far greater accountability 
than an agency’s. While bureaucracy is “the place where exercises of coercive 
power are most unfathomable and thus most threatening,” the presidency is the 
“office peculiarly apt to exercise power in ways that the public can identify and 
evaluate.”194 Moreover, because of the President’s national constituency, “he is 
likely to consider, in setting the direction of administrative policy on an ongoing 
basis, the preferences of the general public, rather than merely parochial 
interests.”195 As a unitary actor, the President can “act without the indecision 
and inefficiency that so often characterize the behavior of collective entities,”196 
while the broad scope of his authority allows him to “synchronize and apply 
general principles to agency action in a way that congressional committees, 
special interest groups, and bureaucratic experts cannot.”197 
Finally, the President can provide energy and dynamism to the regulatory 
process.198 Kagan argued that the general need for a vigorous executive is 
especially acute in the administrative context.199 She asserted that “large-scale 
organizations, left to their own devices, exhibit over time a diminished capacity 
to innovate and a correspondingly greater tendency to do what they have always 
done even in the face of dramatic changes in needs, circumstances, and 
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priorities.”200 For that reason, she considered “torpor a defining feature of 
administrative agencies . . . .”201 
All of the advantages that Kagan cites seem to apply even more strongly to 
direct Presidential action using emergency or national security powers. They 
bypass much of the cumbersome machinery of government, allowing more 
vigorous action. They also place responsibility squarely on the President, 
increasing political accountability. In short, these actions amount to what you 
might call Presidential Administration on steroids. 
All of the virtues of direct presidential action come with their 
corresponding vices. Such actions are high on political accountability, but 
potentially low in terms of expert guidance (depending on the President). It 
would be going too far to say that Trump has operated free of legal constraint.202 
Nevertheless, bypassing the cumbersome machinery of government also means 
bypassing safeguards like the need for congressional authorization and, to a large 
extent, judicial review. In short, the potential for abuse of power, or at least ill-
considered decision making, is substantial. 
Use of emergency powers poses these potential risks in part because 
judicial review of emergency actions is weak. This is not to say that judicial 
review is nonexistent or wholly ineffective. Although both the travel ban and the 
wall ultimately survived in the courts, both were delayed by litigation and the 
travel ban had to be substantially narrowed. Even the broad power over tariffs 
may turn out to have some limits. Moreover, we need to keep in mind that there 
were other situations in which Trump has been thwarted by the courts and others 
in which proposed emergency actions never saw the light of day. Still, judicial 
review is less vigorous where emergency actions are concerned, which does 
undoubtedly increase the risks that power will be abused or misdirected. 
It is hard to quarrel with the general observations about presidential policy 
dominance in the past two Administrations: 
Presidentialism that takes account of process and participatory values; is 
transparent and robust concerning sources, science, and data consulted or relied 
upon; that provides justificatory reasoning that connects policies to statutory 
missions and criteria; and that respects legislative prerogatives and the embedded 
information advantages of line agencies, is, from our perspective, good 
government.203 
On the other hand, “[f]ailure to abide by these conventions, while 
sometimes justified, is generally problematic and anti-democratic.”204 Use 
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of emergency powers is especially prone to evasion of important aspects of 
good governance. 
And yet, there are reasons to doubt whether future presidents will abandon 
the use of emergency powers as policymaking tools. Americans seem 
increasingly frustrated by the inability of the government to respond adequately 
to what they see as urgent societal problems, whether they see those problems 
as free trade and open borders, or wealth inequality and escalating climate 
change. If more conventional means of policy change through Congress or 
rulemaking remain clogged, there will be continuing pressure on Presidents to 
use any available tool to act on their own. If this trend continues, one might hope 
that the process could be improved to include more input from agency experts, 
consultation with congressional leaders, and transparency. 
A separate problem, suggested by President Trump’s early reactions to the 
coronavirus outbreak, is that emergency powers may not be utilized fully when 
they are most needed. Here, too, a process involving fuller reliance on agency 
experts, consultation with Congress, and public transparency could lead to better 
results. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trump Administration has been noteworthy for its willingness to 
breach existing governance norms.205 This has been true not least in its use of 
emergency or national security powers. Agency efforts to bypass normal 
processes based on claims of exceptional circumstances have not been notably 
successful. But some (though not all) presidential actions have survived 
litigation as well as occasional pushback efforts by Congress. 
One of the saving graces—or defects, depending on your perspective—of 
direct presidential action is its reversibility. What one President does with a 
stroke of a pen, the next President can undo just as quickly. That potential for 
impermanence makes these actions most useful in three circumstances. The first 
is where the political consensus is strong enough that an action is likely to prove 
durable anyway. The second is where only a temporary response is called for, 
either because the problem itself is temporary or because action by an agency or 
by Congress will later be forthcoming. The coronavirus outbreak falls into this 
category. And the third, exemplified by Trump’s wall, is where the action has 
results that are irreversible. It is not likely that a later President will ever bother 
demolishing the wall, although it may be allowed to rust into ruin. 
It remains to be seen whether Trump’s uses of extraordinary presidential 
powers will be seen in retrospect as exceptional, or whether they will become 
the “new normal” in our governance systems. His frequent resort to those powers 
could go a long way toward making emergency actions a more routine part of 
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the presidential arsenal. Moreover, Trump’s failure to make aggressive uses of 
emergency powers amid the coronavirus outbreak could reinforce the tendency 
of future Presidents to make use of such powers, if Trump is later seen to have 
acted too timidly. 
If use of emergency powers to achieve domestic policy objectives does 
become normalized, the outcomes will vary depending on the President. Perhaps 
such powers could be used to jumpstart government action against climate 
change. Other presidents might use the same powers to evade environmental 
laws. In any event, there would be a real price to be paid in terms of the 
safeguards that normally surround government action, and in terms of the rule 
of law. Yet the combination of congressional gridlock and regulatory 
ossification may make the temptation to use this shortcut all but irresistible. 
The potential for further eroding checks on executive action is real. It, 
however, should not be exaggerated. As the discussion of a possible climate 
emergency shows, an emergency declaration would unlock some significant 
statutory powers. But while emergency powers are sweeping, they are far from 
covering the universe of actions that would be required by a serious climate 
policy. For better or worse, more conventional governance tools are needed for 
any thorough policy overhaul. The more effectively those tools work, the less 
need that future Presidents will feel to resort to shortcuts. But if no other options 
seem open, the Trump Presidency has created ample precedents for resort to 
emergency and national security powers as a fallback. We can only hope that the 
cost of good governance is not too high. At the same time, we cannot afford to 
eliminate emergency powers, which provide crucial authority in times of 
genuine crisis. The challenge will be maintaining the delicate balance between 
the potential for abuse and the legitimate exercise of emergency powers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
